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IV 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
TONY VINA, I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
JEFFERSON INSURANCE COMPANY ] 
OF NEW YORK, a corporation, 
and TRANSWESTERN GENERAL ] 
AGENCY, a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
JEFFERSON INSURANCE COMPANY ] 
OF NEW YORK, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JON DUNN, 
Third Party Defendant. 
I Case 
JOINT BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS JEFFERSON INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NEW YORK AND TRANSWESTERN GENERAL AGENCY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents (Jefferson herein) and (Transwestern 
herein) are in general agreement with the facts as set forth 
by the Appellant (Vina herein) in his Brief, however, certain 
facts have been omitted by him which should be brought to 
the attention of the Court. 
I 
(1) The Appellant, Vina, and the Third Party 
Defendant, Jon Dunn (Dunn herein), had done business with 
one another for some time and Dunn had procured other insurance i 
policies for Vina both before the loss complained of and 
afterwards (Finding of Fact No. 5, R-213,214,239), none of 
which had been placed through Transwestern or issued by < 
Jefferson (R-237). 
(2) Dunn was not a licensed agent for Jefferson 
or Transwestern, (Finding of Fact No. 5, R-428) and had not < 
executed an appointment as agent with Jefferson or Transwestern, 
and had no binding authority from Jefferson nor authority to 
issue or countersign any policies of insurance for that ^ 
company. 
(3) Dunn delivered the policy of insurance 
issued by Transwestern on behalf of Jefferson to either Vina ^ 
or Pencille (R-268,400) at some time prior to the loss and 
the policy was physically in the possession of Vina at the 
time of the loss (R-226,268). < 
(4) Vina had not complained as to the names of 
the insureds shown on the policy to either Transwestern, 
Jefferson, or to Dunn (R-228). ( 
(5) Vina filed his demand for payment with Trans-
western under the policy on the 2nd day of January 1980 (R-272), 
the loss having occurred either on the evening of December i 
31, 1979, or January 1, and filed a complaint with the Utah 
State Insurance Commission also on the 2nd of January 198 0. 
< 
(6) Appellant in his statement of the facts 
alleges that the Utah State Department of Insurance ordered 
both of the Defendants (Jefferson and Transwestern) to pay 
the claim of the Appellant. This is not true, only Jefferson 
was ordered to pay and it appealed that decision to the 
Supreme Court, which appeal was subsequently dropped when 
the instant action was filed in State District Court thereby 
making the appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of the 
Insurance Department moot. 
(7) Based upon the facts adduced at the trial the 
Trial Court held that the relationship between the various 
parties was that Dunn was at all times acting as a broker in 
his dealings with Transwestern and Jefferson as that word 
was defined under Utah Code Ann. § 31-17-2(1) (1953) (said 
law has been subsequently amended) and, further, Dunn was 
the agent of Vina and Pencille in all of his dealings with 
them and with Transwestern and Jefferson (Conclusion of Law 
No. 2, R-133). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD 
NOT BE DISTURBED AS APPELLANT HAS NOT 
DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The law of Utah is clear that the Court's findings 
of fact will not be disturbed unless the party attacking 
those findings can demonstrate that they are clearly against 
the weight of the evidence. Barrett v. Vickers, 24 Utah 2d 
334, 471 P.2d 157 (1970); Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145 (Utah 
1978); Ute-Cal Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981)• 
Not only will the Supreme Court not disturb the 
Trial Court's findings where there is clear weight supporting 
< 
the findings, Wasatch Bank v. Leany, 44 Utah Adv Rep 22 
(1986) butf also, will not disturb the Findings of Fact 
where the evidence only preponderates in favor of sustaining 
i 
the trial court. Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 
1063 (1942); Arthur v. Chournos, 574 P.2d 723 (Utah 1978). 
In Boccalero, the Supreme Court quoted from Justice 
i 
Wolfe's opinion in Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520f 94 P.2d 
465 (1939) wherein he set up three criteria which if met 
would preclude the Court from overturning the lower court's 
i 
decision. One of the criteria was that: 
"We think the evidence as revealed by 
the record may slightly preponderate 
against its conclusions but such prepon-
derance may well be offset in favor of { 
his conclusions by having seen the witnesses 
and been able to judge by their demeanor 
as to their credibility, then we will 
not reverse." 
The Stanley doctrine remains the law of Utah \ 
today. To the same effect, see Nokes v. Continental Mining 
& Milling Co.y 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 954 (1957). Harrop v. 
Harward, 565 P.2d 70 (1977). However, see Footnote 2 to < 
Decision in Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 
(Utah 1985), wherein the court discusses two standards, 
"substantial" or "clearly erroneous" and cites various Utah 
cases in favor of either standard. 
Vina's complaint seems to be founded upon the 
principles of equity and the cases cited above go to appellate 
review of equity cases and the standards therein applied. 
See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co., 677 
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984). However, while the constitution of 
Utah confers a right for the Supreme Court to make its own 
findings in an equity case as opposed to a law case the 
basic legal concepts of appellate procedure would be applicable 
to both equity and law actions. 
It is respectfully submitted that what Vina wants 
the Supreme Court to do is to read and review the entire 
record to ascertain if it can find sufficient facts to 
sustain the Trial Court's decision. This is not the burden 
of the Supreme Court, this is the burden of the Appellant, 
Vina. 
It is also submitted that it is not the burden of 
Transwestern or Jefferson to burrow through the record to 
pull out the facts that sustain each of the Trial Court's 
findings. It is only their burden to show facts which 
sustain the findings if Vina specifically attachs a finding 
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and attempts to demonstrate that the evidence did not sustain 
that particular finding. 
The burden is upon the Appellant, Vina, to demonstrate 
i 
that, even under the facts of the case, there is clear error 
in the Court's findings. As pointed out in Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), it is the burden of the Appellant 
i 
to marshal all of the evidence and then demonstrate that 
even in reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Trial Court's decision the evidence is still insufficient 
to support the findings of the Trial Court. 
The Supreme Court in Scharf pointed out that the 
starting point, upon appeal, was not to argue the facts 
contended at the time of trial, but to take the Findings of 
Fact of the Trial Court and show that there was no evidence 
to sustain them. The Court observed: 
i 
"Nowhere does he (Appellant) marshal 
the evidence supporting his version of 
the facts, much less the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings. 
Under these circumstances, we decline 
to further consider Erickson's (Appel- { 
lant) attack on the factual findings." 
In J. & M. Const. Inc. v. Southam, 722 P.2d 779 
(Utah 1986), the court after citing Scharf observed: 
i 
"When defendants have not supported 
their argument or asserted facts with 
any adequate, competent citations to 
the record, this Court will not under-
take an analysis of the evidence inde-
pendent of the determinations reached { 
-6-
by the trial court. See State v. 
Hutchings, 672 P.2d 404 (Utah 1983); 
Unkerman v. Lincoln National Life 
Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 
1978)." 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's 
findings should stand and that the Supreme Court should 
follow Scharf and J. & M. Constr. Inc. and not require 
itself or Respondents to attempt to justify the Trial Court's 
findings. 
Vina has not done this. In short, the sole attack 
of Vina to the lower court's ruling must be predicated upon 
an attack upon the conclusions of law. 
POINT TWO 
UNDER UTAH LAW AND THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE, JON DUNN WAS THE AGENT OF TONY VINA. 
Vinaf in his Brief, cites Utah Code Ann § 31-17-1 
(1953), as it was enacted at the time of the events of this 
matter, exactly for what purpose is not clear to these 
respondents (statute is set forth in appendix). Under the 
facts of the case, that statute clearly negates the claim of 
Vina that Dunn was the agent of either Transwestern or 
Jefferson. 
The statute defines an "agent" as one who is 
"authorized" by the insurer (Jefferson). The facts in this 
case clearly showed that Dunn was not "authorized" by Jefferson 
or Transwestern, but to the contrary was an independent 
agent. There was no authority in Dunn to solicit applications 
for insurance for Jefferson or for Transwestern. Dunn 
merely wanted to obtain an insurance policy to cover his 
clients (Vina and Pencille) at the cheapest premium that he 
i 
could find and he went to Transwestern for a premium quote 
(Finding of Fact No, 7, R-4 31) to obtain that policy and 
there was no evidence that he even cared from which company 
i 
he got the policy, but to the contrary, all he did care 
about was the amount of the premium. Clearly, Dunn was 
acting for and on behalf of Vina. 
< 
Dunn had no authority to effectuate or to countersign 
the policy and he had no binding authority to put coverage 
into effect (R-409,431), although he obtained that authority 
for that particular policy from Transwestern after Vina 
elected to purchase the policy for the quoted premium, and 
he did issue a binder, but it was only issued upon the 
express permission of Transwestern and for that particular 
risk (R-431). 
The only thing that Dunn did have authority to do 
was to collect the premium, which he did, in part. The 
facts showed, however, that while the whole premium was 
paid, the payment was not made by Vina or Pencille, but was 
made by Dunn, who advanced the premium payment to Transwestern, 
and then attempted to collect the premium from Vina and 
Pencille, which he only succeeded in doing after the policy 
was canceled and Dunn got credit for the amount of the 
returned unearned premium (R-417). 
Clearly, under Utah Code Ann. § 31-17-1 (1953), 
Dunn was not the agent of either Transwestern or Jefferson; 
nor was he an agent of Transwestern or Jefferson under the 
general law of agency. 
Dunn was actually a broker (R-387) as defined 
under Utah Code Ann. § 31-17-2 (1953), and this is specifically 
what the Trial Court concluded from the facts as adduced 
during the trial of the matter. Vina in his Brief has 
totally failed to show that the facts as adduced at the time 
of trial were such that they did not establish that in fact 
Dunn was a broker as defined under the Utah law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-17-2 (1953), which was applicable 
at the time the policy of insurance was written in April 
1979 reads: 
11
 'Broker1 and 'nonresident broker' 
defined.—'Broker' means any person 
who, on behalf of the insured, for 
compensation as an independent 
contractor, or commission, or fee, 
and not being an agent of the insurer, 
solicits, negotiates, or procures insurance 
or reinsurance or the renewal or continuance 
thereof, or in any manner aids therein, for 
insureds or prospective insureds other than 
himself. A 'nonresident broker' is any such 
person domiciled without this state and 
acting as a broker as above defined in the 
state of his domicile." 
This section was amended, effective May 8, 1979, and at the 
time of the loss read: 
11
 (1) 'Broker means any person who, on 
behalf of the insured, as an independent 
contractor for compensation [as an independent 
contractor/ or commission/—or foe/] and not 
[being] acting as an agent of the insurer, 
solicits, negotiates, or procures insurance 
or reinsurance [or the renewal or continuance 
thereof^] or in any manner aids therein, 
[#o£-] insureds or prospective insureds other * 
than himself. [A 'nonresident broker1—is any 
such person domiciled without this state and-
acting as a broker as above defined in the 
state of his domiciles] A broker is not an 
agent or other representative of an insurer, 
and does not have power, by his own act, to i 
bind the insurers upon any risk or with 
reference to any contract. 
" (2) If a person is licensed to act as an 
insurance broker and as an insurance agent," 
he shall be deemed to be acting as an insurance ( 
agent in the transaction of insurance placed 
with those insurers for whom an appointment 
had been filed with the commissioner in accord-
ance with section 31-17-10 and which is then 
in force. 
"(3) A 'nonresident broker' is any such 
person domiciled without this state and acting 
as a broker as above defined in the state of 
his or her domicile." 
(Underlined portion indicates new material in the amended { 
statute and the line-through indicates the deleted wording 
of the amended statute.) 
Whether the law in effect when the policy was ( 
issued or at the time that the policy was canceled, it is 
submitted that it is immaterial as in either case Dunn was 
still the agent of Vina. { 
The facts of this case show that Dunn indicated to 
Transwestern that the relationship between Vina and Pencille 
was that of a partnership (R-438) and that he thought it was ' 
a partnership (R-473). The policy of insurance that was 
issued indicated that Vina and Pencille were doing business 
together under an assumed name. This policy of insurance 
was given to Vina prior to the fire (R-228) and he made no 
complaint about how the insureds were characterized on the 
face of the policy. 
The facts further showed that when the amount of 
insurance coverage was reduced by Pencille, Vina gave only 
an oral consent to the change, and then only to Dunn (R-
226), and, thus, by his silence established a course of 
conduct with respect to the policy which confirmed with 
Transwestern and Jefferson that Vina was just what the 
policy showed, a partnership (R-414). 
When the policy was canceled by Pencille through 
Dunn, Transwestern and Jefferson had all the right to rely 
upon such signed cancellation as one partner may bind the 
other partner. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 (1953). 
The conduct of Vina, Pencille, and Dunn acting 
together or through their passive conduct created at least 
partnership by estoppel under Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13 (1953) 
(set forth in the appendix to this brief). See Facit-
Addo, Inc., v. Davis Financial Corp., 134 Ariz. 6, 653 P.2d 
356 (1982), an Arizona case which stresses the "reasonableness 
of reliance" standard of the Arizona statute which is identical 
with Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13 (1953). 
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The fact that insurance is involved does not 
change the general principles of Agency Law, The general 
agency law of the United States is that an independent agent 
who solicits insurance for the insured and places that 
insurance with an agent of an insurance company is, if 
anyone's agent, the agent of the insured and not of the 
insurance company. 16 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 
§ 8722 (1981). 
One who secures insurance for another becomes an 
agent of that person. Orsi v. Aetna Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 
283, 703 P.2d 1053 (1985). 
In 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 113, 190, 191 (1981), 
it is said: 
"An insurance broker is primarily the 
agent of the first person who employs him, 
and ordinarily, where employed to procure 
insurance, he becomes the agent of the 
person for whom the insurance is procured, 
at least insofar as all matters connected 
with the procurement itself are concerned, 
with the consequence that his acts and 
representations within the scope of his 
authority are binding upon the insured." 
The facts are clear and found by the court to have 
been proven by the defendants that Dunn was the agent of 
Vina and as a matter of law, Vina is bound by the acts and 
knowledge of that agent. Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of 
Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984). 
-1 2-
Vina chose to entrust his insurance business to 
Dunn, not only for this one policy, but for policies in the 
past, and in so doing, the knowledge of Dunn is imputed to 
Vina. FMA Financial Corp, v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1980) 
Nowhere in Vina's Brief does he attack this finding 
by showing that such facts were not proven by a preponderance 
of evidence. Actually, it is not contended by Vina that 
this was not what actually occurred. 
POINT THREE 
TO ESTABLISH AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL, VINA 
HAD TO SHOW RELIANCE BY HIMSELF UPON 
THE ACTS AND CONDUCT OF TRANSWESTERN 
AND/OR JEFFERSON. 
Vina in Point I of his Argument asserts that the 
conduct of the parties could have created an agency by 
estoppel. 
However, Vina clearly stated at page 7 of Point I 
of his Brief, that "At no time did Vina or Pencille have any 
contact with either of the defendants." Further, Vina did 
not demonstrate that the finding by the Court that there was 
no agency between Vina and Transwestern and Jefferson was in 
error or that the finding was not supported by evidence, 
and, thus, should be overturned on appeal. Ercanbrack v. 
Crandall-Walker Motor Co., 550 P.2d 723 (Utah 1976). 
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It is respectfully submitted that agency by estoppel 
or apparent agency is a question of fact, Wilkerson v. 
Stevens, 16 Utah 2d 424, 403 P.2d 31 (1965), and that to 
prove such a fact, it is necessary to show the conduct of 
the principal, as agency by estoppel is predicated upon the 
apparent power of an agent to act. 
The authoritative work cited by Vina in Point I of 
his Brief, 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency, points out in § 79, a prior 
section to the one cited by Vina, "Reminder" p. 586: 
"Reminder: The apparent power of an 
agent is to be determined by the acts of 
the principal, and not by the acts of 
the agent; a principal is responsible 
for the acts of an agent within his 
apparent authority only where the 
principal by his acts or conduct has 
clothed the agent with the appearance 
of authority, and not where the agent's 
own conduct and statements have created 
the apparent authority." 
This same work in § 80, p. 587, sets forth the 
prerequisites for a finding of apparent power or agency by 
estoppel and states: 
"In order to establish that an agent 
had the apparent authority to do the act 
in question, it must be established (1) 
that the principal has manifested his 
consent to the exercise of such authority 
or has knowingly permitted the agent to 
assume the exercise of such authority, 
(2) that the third person knew of the 
facts and, acting in good faith, had 
reason to believe, and did actually 
believe, that the agent possessed such 
authority; and (3) that the third person, 
-14-
relying on such appearance of authority, 
has changed his position and will be 
injured or suffer loss if the act done 
or transaction executed by the agent 
does not bind the principal." 
Vina does not state any facts from the record to 
establish any of these criteria. 
It is to be noted that "agency by estoppel" standing 
by itself generally requires a change of position. Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 8B, p. 38 (1958) 
Vina does not allege any change of position nor 
any evidence which, factually, demonstrated any such change 
of evidence at the time of trial. 
If Vina had no contact with Transwestern or Jefferson, 
then any reliance that he may have given was based solely 
upon the representations of Dunn and under the law he had no 
right to so rely. 
Vina cites Utah State Univ., etc., v. Sutro & Co., 
646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982), which is a case involving stockbrokers 
and the Utah State University officers on investments and is 
not remotely involved with insurance and the general rules 
of agency that are applicable to insurance agents and insurers 
by reason of the Utah statutes applicable. 
Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815 (Utah 
1974), also cited in Point I of Vina's Brief, involved the 
relationship of a real estate broker who was both selling 
and buying real property and again had nothing to do with 
-15-
insurance. The quote from 3 Am Jur at page 9 of Vina's 
Brief is a quote from a footnote in Foster and deals with 
the effect of an agent selling his own property to his 
principal which has nothing to do with the facts of the case 
now before the Supreme Court, 
POINT FOUR 
< 
DEFENDANTS HAD THE RIGHT TO RELY UPON 
THE REPRESENTATIONS OF PLAINTIFFfS AGENT. 
Plaintiff, in his Point II, attempts to assert 
that Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern was a sole proprietorship. * 
However, plaintiff ignores the proven fact that the application, 
as prepared, executed by the plaintiff, and delivered by his 
agent, Dunn, to the defendant, Transwestern, clearly and * 
unequivocally showed that the relationship of plaintiff and 
Beverly Pencille was that of a partnership. 
The policy itself showed that the parties were { 
partners in the way the policy was styled: 
"Beverly Pencille and Tony Vina, 
d/b/a Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern" 
Vina had the responsibility, if not the duty, to 
read the policy, which he failed to do (R-269). It has long 
been the law that where one procures a policy of insurance 
from a broker, which Dunn was in this case, the insured, 
Vina, had a duty to read the policy and make such changes as 
were required. His failure to do so estopped him from later 
— 1 C_ 
complaining. Charstensen v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 8 Wash. 
2d 72, 111 P.2d 565 (1941). The law is clear that an insurance 
policy will be enforced as written. Wickes v. State Farm 
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 350, 496 P.2d 267 
(1972) . 
Combining the representations of Dunn that Vina 
and Pencille were partners, the conduct of the parties in 
the amendment of the policy by Pencille alone, which was not 
contested by Vina but acquiesced in by oral ratification by 
him, clearly gave the right of Transwestern to rely upon the 
fact that Pencille as partner had the right to bind the 
partnership. See: Point Two above. 
It is, therefore, submitted that the extensive 
authority cited by Vina in Point II of his Brief, while 
interesting, is misplaced and has no bearing under the facts 
of this case. 
Plaintiff completely failed to prove that the 
defendants had any knowledge of separate ownership or interests 
in the property insured. This was Vina's burden which he 
failed to prove. No citation to the record is made by Vina 
that he did in fact prove this point and it is submitted 
that the record contains no such references. 
As pointed out in the early case of Standard Oil 
Co. v. Triumph Ins. Co., 64 N.Y. 85 (1876), that where an 
insurance broker is employed by a party to effect insurance 
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for himf the insurer has the right to rely upon that broker's 
authority to act for the broker's principal in the procuring, 
modifying, or canceling of that and other policies of insurance. 
In the facts of the case now before the Court, 
Dunn's responsibilities with respect to the policy went 
beyond just obtaining the policy. Dunn continued to act for 
the insureds in the revision of the policy limits (R-444) 
seeing that required repairs were accomplished (R-44 9) and 
in the cancellation of the policy by getting the necessary 
forms signed by Pencille to cancel the policy (R-454). 
Thus, the argument and the citation of authority that Dunn's 
authority ceased upon the issuance of the policy of insurance 
i 
does not conform to the evidence which was introduced at the 
time of trial nor to the proven facts of this case. 
As pointed out in 16 Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice § 8730, 162: 
"The fact that the insurance was really 
intended for the benefit of one other than 
the named insured would not bind the insurer, 
where such intention, though known to the { 
broker, was not made known to the company." 
In the case of Orsi v. Aetna Ins. Co., 41 Wash. 
App. 233, 703 P.2d 1053 (1985), the Washington Appellate 
Court held that where one is retained to acquire insurance 
for another and clothed with the authority to determine 
which insurance company will be chosen, the form of the 
_1 Q_ 
I 
policy and the amount of insurance, that agent has authority 
to cancel a policy. This case at p. 1057 then cites extensive 
authority including Couch on Insurance for this proposition. 
Under the facts of the case now before the Utah 
high court, Dunn was given exclusive authority to place the 
insurance with such company as he should select, taking into 
account the premium therefor (R-488); the amount of insurance, 
which he selected, later reduced by Pencille; and the form 
of the policy (R-428,429). Thus, under the facts of this 
case, it squares directly with Orsi cited above. The Annotation 
referred to in that case, Annot., 83 A.L.R. 311 (1933), 
cites other authority to the same effect. 
A case arising in Oregon, Hiransomboon v. Unigard 
Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Or. App. 493, 612 P.2d 306 (1980), held 
that where the insured gave power to place policies into 
effect through an agent due to the agent's expertise and 
trust of the insured in the agent's discretion, the same 
facts as found in the relationship between Vina and Dunn, 
that relationship gave the agent the power to cancel a 
policy and the insured was bound by what the agent did or 
did not do and the remedy was between the insured and his 
agent, not the insurance company. In this case, the Oregon 
Court expressly rejected the argument that an agent will not 
bind his principal merely because it is an insurance matter 
Hiransomboon, 612 P.2d at 308. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the matter of 
the authority of an agent is a matter of fact and that the 
trial court found as a matter of law that the agency relationship 
existed between Dunn and Vina (Conclusion of Law 2, R-133)f 
and Vina upon appeal has shown no error on the part of the 
trial court in making this finding. He is bound thereby, 
and it falls that as a matter of law, the cancellation of 
the policy, upon express and written authorization of the 
apparent partner of Vina, is binding upon Vina. He may have 
a complaint against Dunn and/or Pencille, but not against 
Transwestern or Jefferson Insurance. 
POINT FIVE 
THE AMENDMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST DUNN DOES NOT 
CONCERN TRANSWESTERN OR JEFFERSON. 
In Point III of Vina's Brief, he asserts that the 
Trial Court erred in not permitting Vina to file an amended 
complaint against Dunn, seeking recovery against him for 
negligence or breach of contract. 
This is a matter strictly between Dunn and Vina 
and Transwestern and Jefferson, having no interest in the 
matter, decline to address this matter in their brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondents, Transwestern General Agency and 
Jefferson Insurance Company, respectfully submit that the 
Trial Court's finding of agency between Dunn and Vina is 
conclusive and was founded upon sufficient and substantial 
evidence and that the Appellant, Vina, has failed to demonstrate 
or show that this finding was contrary to the evidence. 
It is respectfully submitted that the cancellation 
by Vina's partner, as shown on the insurance application, 
was binding upon Vina as far as either Transwestern or 
Jefferson are concerned and that the Court's judgment of 
dismissal of Vina's complaint as to them was proper and 
should be upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
// PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
*S Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377 
Attorney for Transwestern 
:D W. SLAGLE 
Post Office Box 45^0j 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorney for Jefferson 
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APPENDIX 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13 (1953) 
48-1-13- Partner by estoppel. (1) When a person by words spoken or 
written or by conduct represents himself, or consents to another's repre-
senting him, to any one as a partner, in an existing partnership or with 
one or more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such person 
to whom such representation has been made who has on the faith of such 
representation given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and, if 
he has made such representation or consented to its being made in a public 
manner, he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has 
not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit by, or with 
the knowledge of, the apparent partner making the representation or con-
senting to its being made. l 
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were an 
actual member of the partnership. 
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly with the 
other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or representation as 
to incur liability; otherwise, separately. 
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner m an 
existing partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners he 
is an agent of the persons consenting to such representation to bind them 
to the same extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner 
in fact with respect to persons who rely upon the representation. Where 
all the* members of an existing partnership consent to the representation, 
a partnership act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint 
act or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting to the 
representation. 
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